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After revealing the various notions of international public order, the study will focus on 
the one that according to the author is to be preferred. Furthermore, such a notion is in line with 
the position taken by the United Sections of the Italian Court of Cassation in two relevant recent 
judgements.  
Illustration will be subsequently provided of the considerable attempts to replace the 
aforementioned view that are already emerging not only among the scholars (who are giving 
rise to a very heated debate in this subject matter perhaps more than in others), but also in some 
later judgements. It is to be hoped that these attempts will not be successful (at least not in the 
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near future), if only to preserve the effectiveness of the “nomophilacy” function of the United 
Sections of the Court of Cassation, that is the function of ensuring the highest possible level of 
compliance and uniform interpretation of the law and consequently, along with it, the legal 
certainty1. 
 
 2. The four different hypothetical notions of international public order  
 Given that the international public order is «meant to protect the founding values of the 
domestic legal order concerned»2, going a little more in detail, it is possible, although with a 
certain approximation, to imagine at least four different notions, in order of decreasing 
amplitude of the relative contents (and correspondingly of increasing possibility of execution 
of foreign judicial measures in Italy). 
A first hypothetical notion of international public order could be so extensive as to 
embrace all or almost all the mandatory rules of the Italian law. However, such a notion would 
come considerably close to that of internal public order, so that it would be very difficult if not 
impossible for foreign judicial measures issued on the basis and in application of rules that may 
be significantly different from the Italian ones to produce effects in Italy. This opinion has been 
quite commonly shared among the Italian scholars in the past, but it seems, for some time now, 
very difficult to be supported in a context of widespread international cooperation, if only in so 
far as it would risk to imply a denial of the very existence of private international law3. 
 However, it is possible to conceptualize a second and less broad notion of international 
public order which, while also referring to the ordinary Italian legislation, does not take into 
consideration all or almost all the mandatory rules relevant in the context of internal public 
order, but only some of them4. Those rules should be only those necessary from a constitutional 
point of view, even if without any constitutional constrain with regard to their specific contents; 
that is to say, the rules implementing constitutional principles, even if only on a discretionary 
basis5 , including in this category both the principles of the Italian Constitution and those 
 
1 It is important always to remind also in Italy what is traditionally pointed out especially in the 
French literature, namely that «un revirement de jurisprudence est une chose grave» (see, among others, 
S. BOLLÉE and B. HAFTEL, L’art d’être inconstant. Regards sur les récents développements de la 
jurisprudence in matière de gestation pour autrui, in Rev. crit. DIP, 2020, p. 274, note 21). 
 2 M.C. BARUFFI, International surrogacy arrangements test the public policy exception. An 
Italian perspective, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 2017/2018, 19, p. 296. 
 3 For further references and cases, see M. TESCARO, L’ordine pubblico internazionale nella 
giurisprudenza italiana in tema di risarcimento punitivo e di maternità surrogata, in Nuovo dir. civ., 
2020, p. 24 ss.   
 4 For an interesting example, see M. DOGLIOTTI, Le Sezioni Unite condannano i due padri e 
assolvono le due madri, in Fam. e dir., 2019, p. 673, who hypothesizes a foreign measure that is to some 
extent discriminatory towards children who are born outside marriage, whose effectiveness in Italy 
should be denied not only in consideration of para. 3 of art. 30 of the Constitution (which may not be 
sufficient to reach this purpose since it is just offering «any legal and social protection» for children who 
are born outside marriage only if «compatible with the rights of members of the legitimate family») but 
also, and above all, on the basis of the results of the reform of the filiation law in Italy as expressed in 
the l. no. 219/2012 and the d. lgs. no. 154/2013, which stated a regime of a unitary status of a 
son/daughter. 
 5 On the topic, see O. FERACI, La nozione di ordine pubblico alla luce della sentenza della Corte 
di Cassazione (Sez. Un. civ.), no. 12193/2019: tra «costituzionalizzazione attenuata» e bilanciamento 
con il principio del superiore interesse del minore, in Riv. dir. int., 2019, p. 1144 s.  
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enshrined in charters – not always perfectly in line with each other 6  – at European and 
international level which have nonetheless constitutional value in Italy. Such a notion would 
impose the task, certainly complicated but not impossible, of grouping the mandatory rules in 
the Italian law within two different categories (those implementing constitutional principles, 
albeit in a discretionary manner, and those merely not in conflict with them). Such an approach 
may lead to results that could appear inadequate to fully guarantee the legal certainty and the 
predictability of the judicial decisions, but it would overcome the above-mentioned 
fundamental objections towards the more traditional thesis, appearing as a plausible mean to 
review it. 
 Theoretically, a third and even more restricted notion of international public order could 
be considered. Such a notion would exclusively involve rules of higher hierarchical level than 
the ordinary law. In other terms, rules which may not be discretionally modified by the ordinary 
law, based not only on the Constitution but also on the European and international instruments 
of constitutional status to which Italy is bound7. Such a notion would probably not be much 
better than the previous one from the point of view of the legal certainty and of the predictability 
of judicial decisions if only by considering how general the terms provided in the fundamental 
laws are (those will be taken into consideration again in the following paragraph)8. However, 
this notion could be more favorable with respect to the effectiveness of foreign measures in 
Italy, at least if these measures are issued in application of rules implementing (albeit in a 
different way from the Italian ones) principles which can be deemed of constitutional status 
also for the Italian legal order. 
 Finally, there may be a fourth notion of international public order, aimed at maximizing 
the value of fundamental European and international instruments as well as the international 
cooperation and the globalization as positive objectives to be pursued with growing 
determination also from the point of view under consideration in this study. In this way, such a 
narrow notion of international public order can be outlined that would be merely used to exclude 
the efficacy in Italy only of foreign measures issued in application of rules devoid of any 
connection, even if very generic, both to the Constitution or to the other international charters 
and instruments considered as of constitutional status in Italy. That is to say, of foreign 
measures that are based on opinions that are not receiving significant approval at international 
level. Similar to the opposite extreme thesis considered at first above, the latter seems 
nonetheless difficult to be supported9, especially since it would imply an almost total opening 
 
 6  On this issue, see, among others, J.H.H. WEILER, Diritti umani, costituzionalismo ed 
integrazione: iconografia e feticismo, in Quad. cost., 2002, p. 530 s. 
 7 In accordance with this opinion, see, among the judicial decisions, Cass., 30 September 2016, 
no. 19599, in Corr. giur., 2017, p. 181 ss., with a note by G. FERRANDO, Ordine pubblico e interesse 
del minore nella circolazione degli status filiationis, and in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2017, p. 372 ss., 
with a comment by G. PALMIERI, Le ragioni della trascrivibilità del certificato di nascita redatto 
all’estero a favore di una coppia same sex, p. 362 ss. See also Cass., 15 June 2017, no. 14878, in 
www.articolo29.it/2017, with a note by S. STEFANELLI, Riconoscimento dell’atto di nascita da due 
madri, in difetto di legame genetico con colei che non ha partorito. 
 8 International public order is by its nature a generic and elastic notion; it is the notion with a 
variable content par excellence in the field of private international law. In this sense, see O. FERACI, 
L’ordine pubblico nel diritto dell’Unione europea, Milan, 2012, p. 9 s.  
 9 In the literature, see, among others, V. BARBA, L’ordine pubblico internazionale, in Rass. dir. 
civ., 2018, p. 412 s., who thinks of an uncontrolled and unacceptable shift with regard to the notion of 
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to foreign measures10. It would entail the substantial negation of the parameter of international 
public order (not to mention the national sovereignty)11, in contrast to the Italian legislation that 
repeatedly affirms it. Furthermore, such an approach would be different from that employed in 
the legislation of many other States (even if Member States of the European Union) on the same 
matter12. 
 
 3. The preferability of a relatively advanced notion of international public order 
 Having to reject, as it has been clarified above, both the opposite extreme theses, there 
are two lines of argument that remain: one that refers only to the constitutional provisions; and 
another one that does not exclude also some of the mandatory rules provided by the ordinary 
laws (such as those rules implementing, although discretionarily, constitutional principles). 
 In the opinion of the author, it is the last notion of international public order that is to be 
preferred, as far as it is not actually giving rise to greater uncertainty than the other notion under 
consideration13. In addition, it allows that the inevitable flexibility of the subject matter is, as 
much as possible, driven by the discretion of the legislator, rather than by that (although perhaps 
enlightened) of the judge14. 
 As a matter of fact, if in any case the constitutional provisions must be considered at the 
center of the notion of international public order, it should be kept in mind that they are fairly 
pluralistic and therefore require, at least to a certain extent, to be specified elsewhere15. In this 
case, it is at least more “democratic” that this necessary, and to some extent discretionary, work 
of concretization of the constitutional choices would be undertaken in the (also) ordinary 
 
international public order that would occur if reference would be made to the rules of a different and 
autonomous international legal order common to several States. 
 10 For a firm objection to a sort of uncritical appeal to what comes from abroad, as if it would be 
always and by definition better than what is existing in the Italian law, see more recently A. MONTANARI, 
Del «risarcimento punitivo» ovvero dell’ossimoro, in Eur. dir. priv., 2019, p. 452. 
 11 See, among others, M.C. BARUFFI, op. cit., p. 310, according to whom «a globalisation of the 
notion of public policy […] seems to overlook its fundamental nature». 
 12 See, more recently, M. LENDERMANN, Strafschadensersatz im internationalen Rechtsverkehr, 
Tübingen, 2019, p. 151 s., where, in particular with reference to punitive damages, it is emphasized that 
«der ordre public-Vorbehalt wird durch die nationalen Rechtsgrundsätze des jeweiligen 
Anerkennungsstaates bestimmt, die in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten sehr stark voneinander 
unterscheiden. Von einem einheitlichen unionsrechtlichen ordre public kann […] keine Rede sein». 
 13 The excessive indeterminacy of the merely constitutional notion of international public order 
has been more recently persuasively highlighted by FA. FERRARI, Profili costituzionali dell’ordine 
pubblico internazionale. Su alcuni “passi indietro” della Corte di Cassazione in tema di PMA, in 
BioLaw Journal – Rivista di BioDiritto, no. 2/2020, p. 169 ss. 
 14 For brilliant observations on the fact that the role of the legislator should return to a higher 
value compared to that of the judges in the creation of the rules, see, in particular, M. LUCIANI, 
Costituzionalismo irenico e costituzionalismo polemico, in Giur. cost., 2006, p. 1643 ss.; as well as N. 
IRTI, Dalla lontana provincia del diritto civile, in Dir. pubbl., 2016, p. 826 ss. 
 15 As it has been particularly well clarified in M. DOGLIANI and I. MASSA PINTO, Elementi di 
diritto costituzionale, 2a ed., Turin, 2017, p. 157 s.; M. DOGLIANI, Interpretazioni della Costituzione, 
Milan, 1982, p. 22 s. See also, among others, J.H.H. WEILER, op. cit., p. 528; as well as, for further 
references, more recently, FA. FERRARI, op. cit., p. 178 ss. 
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legislation16, whose relevance should therefore not be radically denied even with regard to the 
international public order. 
 Should we prefer instead an exclusively constitutional notion of international public 
order, we would end up introducing into the Italian legal system a kind of diffused system of 
constitutional review for its implementation, in contrast with what provided in art. 134 of the 
Italian Constitution, which instead entrusts the task of a centralized constitutional review to the 
Constitutional Court17. 
 Furthermore, from the perspective of the hierarchy of the sources of law, it would be 
paradoxical that the international public order would have a rigidly and exclusively 
constitutional content, despite the fact that the Constitution itself carefully avoids mentioning 
this notion18. 
 
 4. The emergence of the notion herewith preferred in the 2017 United Sections 
judgement on punitive damages 
A notion of international public order similar to the one herewith preferred has also been 
affirmed by the United Sections of the Court of Cassation. It happened for the first time in an 
eminent judgement issued in 2017 on the subject of punitive damages19, a topic that also outside 
of Italy is considered as a «Musterbeispiel par excellence»20. 
In this judgement, after recognizing a profound evolution of the international public 
order notion (in this case, based on art. 64, l. no. 218/1995), in essence, it is provided that a US 
punitive damages judgement can be recognized and enforced in Italy, although only in case 
three conditions are satisfied, namely: typicality, predictability and proportionality21 of the 
foreign sanction22. 
 
 16 In favor of enhancing the role of ordinary legislation with respect to the creativity in the 
interpretation of the law undertook by the judges, solid opinions have been more recently expressed in 
A. ZACCARIA, Il diritto privato europeo nell’epoca del post-postmodernismo, in Riv. dir. civ., 2020, p. 
1 ss. 
 17 In this sense, see FA. FERRARI, op. cit., p. 183. See also O. FERACI, La nozione di ordine 
pubblico alla luce della sentenza della Corte di Cassazione (Sez. Un. civ.), no. 12193/2019, cit., p. 1147, 
who speaks, in relation to the opinion criticized here, of a controversial hermeneutic operation that is in 
any case impracticable. 
 18 With the special case of what provided – after the l. cost. no. 3/2001 – in art. 117, para. 2, lett. 
h, Cost., where, with specific regard to the relationship between State and regional legislative power, 
the exclusive competence of the State is reaffirmed in the matter of «public order and security, with the 
exception of the local administrative police». 
 19 Cass., Sez. Un., 5 July 2017, no. 16601, in Danno e resp., 2017, p. 419 ss. For an attempt to 
organize the main readings on the aforementioned judgement and also foresee its future relevance, see 
M. TESCARO, Le variazioni qualitative e quantitative del danno risarcibile, in Danno e resp., 2018, p. 
533 ss. 
 20 M. WÜRDINGER, Der ordre public-Vorbehalt bei Verzugsaufschlägen im niederländischen 
Arbeitsrecht, in IPRax, 2013, p. 323; M. LENDERMANN, op. cit., p. 149. 
 21 More in general on the principle of proportionality as a fundamental principle with respect to 
which no derogation would be tolerable, see, more recently, V. BARBA, op. cit., p. 443. 
 22 The three requirements are listed very clearly in V. ROPPO, La responsabilità civile di Pietro 
Trimarchi, in Jus civ., 2017, p. 701. See also, among others, in English, O. FERACI, Towards the 
Europeanization of public policy regarding punitive damages: an inquiry between theory and practice, 
in Punitive damages and private international law: state of the art and future developments, edited by 
S. BARIATTI, L. FUMAGALLI and Z. CRESPI REGHIZZI, Milan, 2019, p. 317. 
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 More specifically, with regard to the international public order, the judgement hints in 
the first place – with particular reference to the evolution of the European Union – at a new 
function of promoting the protected values23. Nonetheless, in this judgement it is also possible 
to notice the re-emergence of a more traditional perspective according to which «the foreign 
judgement that is applicable to an institution not regulated by national law, even if not restricted 
by European regulations, must be weighed against the provisions of the Constitution and of 
those laws which, as sensitive nerves, fibers of the sensory apparatus and parts vital to an 
organism, make the constitutional order real», and according to which «Constitutions and legal 
traditions with their diversities constitute a frontier still alive» (albeit «deprived of selfish veins, 
which gave “shortness of breath”, but made more complex by intertwining with the 
international context in which the State is placed»)24. 
 Although there is no shortage of (sometimes considerably) different opinions25, that can 
be understood in the light of the polysemy26 of the expressions used and more generally the 
nature of compromise27 of the judgement under consideration, it seems that the same relatively 
broad notion of public order considered above as the preferable one has been accepted, with the 
consequence that an attitude of tendential closure to the recognition in Italy of foreign 
judgements on the matter of punitive damages should be established by the courts in the future28. 
 Despite the explicit acceptance of this relatively broad notion of international public 
order, in the 2017 United Sections judgement under discussion emphasis is given, in its private 
 
 23 The relevance of such promotional function of public order is remarked, among others, in M. 
GRONDONA, La responsabilità civile tra libertà individuale e responsabilità sociale. Contributo al 
dibattito sui “risarcimenti punitivi”, Naples, 2017, p. 124 ss.; as well as in N. RIZZO, Le funzioni della 
responsabilità civile tra concettualizzazioni e regole operative, in Resp. civ. prev., 2018, p. 1814. 
 24 On this issue, see, among others, G. DE NOVA, Le nuove frontiere del risarcimento del danno: 
i punitive damages, in Jus civ., 2017, p. 391 (now also in ID., Arbitrato, contratto, danno, Turin, 2019, 
p. 259 s.), where a relatively traditional notion of international public order is brilliantly supported, 
based both on constitutional principles and on certain principles of Italian law found outside the 
Constitution. 
 25 See, among others, FR. FERRARI, Il riconoscimento delle sentenze straniere sui danni punitivi. 
Brevi cenni comparatistici all’indomani della pronunzia italiana del 5 luglio, in Riv. dir. civ., 2018, p. 
282, who talked about the three aforementioned conditions as of requirements that will probably never 
be an impediment to the recognition of foreign measures; C. CASTRONOVO, Diritto privato e realtà 
sociale. Sui rapporti tra legge e giurisdizione a proposito di giustizia, in Eur. e dir. priv., 2017, p. 794 
ss., according to whom the United Sections, arguably, would have used the notion of international public 
order centered only around constitutional principles. 
 26  Remarked in U. SALANITRO, Ordine pubblico internazionale, filiazione omosessuale e 
surrogazione di maternità, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2019, I, p. 738. 
 27 On this issue, see M. TESCARO, op. ult. cit., p. 534. In similar terms, see also, more recently, 
A.M. BENEDETTI, Sanzionare compensando? Per una liquidazione non ipocrita del danno non 
patrimoniale, in Riv. dir. civ., 2019, p. 225 and 237. Among others, see also R. CARLEO, Punitive 
damages: dal common law all’esperienza italiana, in Contr. impr., 2018, p. 260, where the author thinks 
of an innovation, however in a well-reasoned and cautious manner. 
 28 See, among others, P. IVALDI, Civil Liability for Health Damages and Uniform Rules of 
Private International Law, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2017, p. 881, who very persuasively remarks that 
«the openness of the Plenary Session of the Court of Cassation towards punitive damages seems to be 
wisely inspired by caution and moderation». Among the judicial cases, substantially in line with the 
aforementioned tendency towards closure, see Trib. Siracusa, ord. 5 December 2018, in Nuova giur. civ. 
comm., 2019, I, p. 936 ss., with a (critical) note by F. CAROCCIA, Dell’ordine pubblico e dei danni 
punitivi. Una rosa è una rosa? 
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international law related part, exclusively to constitutional provisions, essentially just arguing 
that the foreign judgement awarding compensation that is intended to be “imported” in Italy 
should not be in conflict with the values that govern the matter, based on articles 23 and 25 of 
the Italian Constitution29. At first sight, such an approach may seem to be a point of ambiguity 
or even as showing a contradiction within the judgement, and this explains why the part of the 
judgement where the notion of international public order is generally addressed could have been 
considered by some scholars as an empty declamation30. Nonetheless, it seems that there is no 
inconsistency and that, even without considering the compromising character of the judgement, 
in the end, the Court of Cassation has somehow clearly showed a preference for the 
aforementioned notion of international public order, although the judgement did not apply it to 
the case at hand, simply because in this case there were not even punitive damages with regard 
to which to carry out a specific evaluation of whether the parameters provided by the Italian 
Constitution had been observed or not31. 
 
 5. The confirmation and further elaboration of the same notion of international 
public order in the 2019 United Sections judgement on surrogate motherhood 
 
 29 Among the scholars, right before the judgement of the United Sections, the relevance of these 
regulatory references has been particularly underlined in M. SESTA, Il danno nelle relazioni familiari 
tra risarcimento e finalità punitiva, in Fam. e dir., 2017, p. 289 and 295. On a fairly similar line of 
thought, see also, more recently, A. MONTANARI, op. cit., p. 377 ss. and especially 390 ss. Before the 
aforementioned judgement, these have been discussed also in C. GRANELLI, In tema di «danni punitivi», 
in Resp. civ. prev., 2014, p. 1760 (who advocated, above all, for a particular theoretical framework of 
the subject – different from the prevailing one – as “punitive performances” of the wrongdoing but 
outside the tort law area and therefore, although in principle opening to the possibility that US 
judgements could be recognized in Italy, on the other hand, by keeping safe the function of the Italian 
civil liability, which could continue being purely the one of offering a compensation and not to punish 
or to deter; for a recent extensive study adopting this perspective, see C. DE MENECH, Le prestazioni 
pecuniarie sanzionatorie. Studio per una teoria dei «danni punitivi», Milan, 2019, p. 53 ss.). 
 30 See C. CASTRONOVO, op. cit., p. 794, according to whom, in the judgement of the United 
Sections there would be the addition of some prudential warnings which, nonetheless, would be merely 
decorative; C. DE MENECH, op. cit., p. 32 s. However, a different position on this issue can be found, 
among others, in M.C. BARUFFI, ibidem; A. SASSI and S. STEFANELLI, Ordine pubblico differenziato e 
diritto allo stato di figlio nella g.p.a., in www.articolo29.it/2018, p. 5. 
 31 See, in this regard, M. DOGLIOTTI, op. cit., p. 673. In the judgement, there are actually also 
references to the ordinary Italian legislation, but only with regard to the question of the functions of 
Italian civil liability as faced from a merely domestic perspective, even if the United Sections deal with 
this question before that of private international law relating to the possibility of the recognition and 
enforcement in Italy of a US judgement on punitive damages. Although the point – not elaborated by 
the United Sections, it is worth repeating, simply because in the case at hand the punitive damages were 
not of relevance – is discussed, it seems to have been assumed that, in the future, the fulfillment or not 
of the Italian constitutional requirements – and in particular of the most relevant one, the one of 
proportionality – will have to be assessed in the light not only of foreign law but also, to some extent, 
of the domestic ordinary law: in this sense see, also for further references, M. TESCARO, Das “moderate” 
Revirement des italienischen Kassationshofs bezüglich der US-amerikanischen punitive damages-
Urteile, in Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 2018, p. 475 s.; W. WURMNEST, Towards a 
European concept of public policy regarding punitive damages?, in Punitive damages and private 
international law: state of the art and future developments, edited by S. BARIATTI, L. FUMAGALLI and 
Z. CRESPI REGHIZZI, cit., p. 282; G. BIAGIONI, Recognition of punitive damages in Italy, ivi, p. 230. 
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 The same notion of international public order herewith upheld was then confirmed and 
further clarified again by the United Sections of the Court of Cassation in another well-known 
judgement issued in 2019 which was touching upon the subject of surrogate motherhood32. In 
this judgement, the problem of the compatibility of a measure issued by a Canadian public 
authority with this notion of international public order (based on articles 16 and 65, l. no. 
218/1995, as well as art. 18, d.p.r. no. 396/2000) has been addressed and it has been resolved 
in a negative sense. The Canadian measure granting co-parenting (that is to say, second 
fatherhood) of two twins born from surrogate motherhood to one of the spouses – for same-sex 
marriage entered into in Canada – devoid of any biological relationship has not been 
recognized33.  
  In particular, with regard to the notion of international public order34, the 2019 United 
Sections judgement is, in the first place, recalling the fact that the trend in the decisions of the 
Court of Cassation in the recent years has shifted towards abandoning the traditional merely 
defensive approach. In fact, there are numerous rulings that, in order to provide such a notion 
with substance, have already placed the accent on constitutional as well as (even more) on 
international law rules35. The judgement is also recalling the position taken by the 2017 United 
Sections decision on punitive damages, trying to frame it – more than what it really is – in a 
line of perfect continuity with the previous judgements aimed at remarking the relevance of the 
principles of international and supranational charters and instruments, along with those of the 
Italian Constitution. 
However, the 2019 United Sections do also affirm that the 2017 judgement on punitive 
damages highlighted an important aspect, which perhaps remained in the shadow of the more 
general statements of the previous rulings, although it was taken into consideration while 
examining the specific cases. It highlighted how the relevance of ordinary law (according to its 
interpretation consolidated in the practice) has also been recognized as an instrument for the 
implementation of the constitutional values and therefore it is necessary to be taken into account 
in the notion of international public order36. 
 After having described in this way the notion of international public order deemed to be 
applied, the 2019 judgement clarifies that the case at hand was fully falling within the category 
 
 32 Cass., Sez. Un., 8 May 2019, no. 12193, in Fam. e dir., 2019, p. 653 ss. 
 33  For further references, see M. TESCARO, L’ordine pubblico internazionale nella 
giurisprudenza italiana in tema di risarcimento punitivo e di maternità surrogata, cit., p. 37 ss. 
 34 Which is the aspect representing the essential core of the judgement, as underlined in G. 
FERRANDO, Maternità per sostituzione all’estero: le Sezioni Unite dichiarano inammissibile la 
trascrizione dell’atto di nascita. Un primo commento, in Fam. e dir., 2019, p. 678. 
 35 See supra, note 7. 
 36 In adherence to this opinion with specific regard to the notion of international public order 
chosen by the United Sections, see A. NICOLUSSI, Famiglia e biodiritto civile, in Eur. dir. priv., 2019, 
p. 746, according to whom this notion remains above all a category of domestic law, which cannot be 
understood regardless of the way in which the ordinary law has given specific contents to the 
fundamental principles of a certain legal order. 
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of surrogate motherhood37, which could be rather called «dissociated motherhood»38 (in any 
case, different from the assisted fertilization, albeit heterologous 39 ). As a matter of fact, 
surrogate motherhood is punishable under the Italian criminal law40 and therefore, already on 
the basis of this circumstance, it can be deduced as certainly forbidden on the ground of public 
order41 . Continuing with their argument, the United Sections consider the prohibition of 
surrogacy of maternity as the necessary link between the regime of the medically assisted 
procreation and the general one of filiation. This marks the limit beyond which the principle of 
self-responsibility, based on the consent of the parties to such a practice, ceases to act, and the 
favor veritatis comes back into play. Based on the latter, the prevalence of genetic and 
biological identity can be justified, without leading to the cancellation of the interest of the 
minor42.  
 
 37 The essential feature of which, according to the United Sections, is the fact that a woman lends 
her body (and eventually the ova necessary for conception) in order to help another person or a sterile 
couple to fulfill their desire to have a child, assuming the obligation to provide for the pregnancy and 
delivery on their behalf, as well as committing to give them the unborn. For an in-depth analysis on the 
various types of surrogacy that may occur, see, more recently, I. RIVERA, La complessa questione della 
maternità surrogata tra rispetto dell’ordine pubblico e protezione del best interest of the child: un 
percorso ermeneutico non sempre coerente, in Soc. dir., 2020, p. 206 ss. 
 38 E. BERGAMINI, Problemi di diritto internazionale privato collegati alla riforma dello status di 
figlio e questioni aperte, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2015, p. 331. 
 39 In the literature, see, among others, also for further references, MI. BIANCA, La tanto attesa 
decisione delle Sezioni Unite. Ordine pubblico versus superiore interesse del minore?, in Familia, 2019, 
p. 375 s., who highlights that the key element of the surrogacy is the pregnancy for others, which makes 
it possible to draw a clear distinction with heterologous fertilization, where there is only the use of other 
people’s genetic material. 
 40 However, the provisions in the criminal law in their current, fairly broad, formulation (indeed, 
see art. 12, para. 6, l. no. 40/2004, according to which «Anyone who, in any form, carries out, organizes 
or advertises the commercialization of gametes or embryos or the surrogacy is punished with 
imprisonment from three months to two years and with a fine from 600,000 to one million euros») do 
not seem capable of covering their infringement put in place by Italian citizens abroad (for further 
information on this point, see A. SASSI and S. STEFANELLI, op. cit., p. 8), and consequently a law 
proposal has been submitted (n. 519 of June 25th, 2018, XVIII legislature, based on the initiative of 
senator Gasparri) with the aim of extending the coverage of the criminal law rules also to these cases. 
 41 A similar line of thinking had already emerged in a decision of the Court of Cassation (see 
Cass., 11 November 2014, no. 24001, in Corr. giur., 2015, p. 471 ss., with a note by A. RENDA, La 
surrogazione di maternità tra principi costituzionali ed interesse del minore) and also in a decision of 
the Constitutional Court (see Corte cost., 18 December 2017, no. 272, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2018, 
I, p. 546 ss., with a comment by A. GORGONI, Art. 263 c.c.: tra verità e conservazione dello status 
filiationis, p. 540 ss.; on the subject, see also M. SESTA, L’atto di nascita del cittadino straniero nato in 
Italia non può recare il riconoscimento di due madri, in Fam. e dir., 2020, p. 331, who considers the 
last mentioned judgement to be the most relevant among the recent judicial decisions concerning the 
law on filiation). 
 42 Severe criticisms have been raised with regard to the notion of «best interest of the child» and 
some of its usages: in particular, see L. LENTI, Note critiche in tema di interesse del minore, in Riv. dir. 
civ., 2016, p. 86 s.; F.D. BUSNELLI, Il diritto della famiglia di fronte al problema della difficile 
integrazione delle fonti, in Riv. dir. civ., 2016, p. 1467. Nonetheless, the perspective aimed at 
considering this concept in broadly positive terms and at developing this notion under various aspects 
is supported, among others, in V. SCALISI, Il superiore interesse del minore ovvero il fatto come diritto, 
in Riv. dir. civ., 2018, p. 405 ss.; P. STANZIONE, La genitorialità tra legittimità, verità e responsabilità, 
in Rass. dir. civ., 2019, p. 668 ss. 
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 As a matter of fact, in order to protect the interest of the minor in any case, the court 
practice has already recognized the possibility to use other legal remedies, namely the adoption 
in particular cases and especially in the one referred in art. 44, para. 1, lett. d), l. no. 184/1983, 
which is considered applicable under the only condition of the «ascertained impossibility of 
pre-adoptive custody», to be understood not as a de facto impossibility, deriving from a 
situation of abandonment of the minor, but as the impossibility in legal terms to put in place a 
pre-adoptive custody43. This solution has been accepted by the United Sections, which do 
consider it compatible with the international conventions on the matter and the judicial practice 
trends already formed in this regard44. 
 It follows that the notion of international public order adopted by the United Sections in 
the 2019 judgement is relatively broad – or, if it may be preferred, complex45 – since it does 
also imply an unequivocal openness to the consideration of some norms provided in the 
ordinary laws46. This openness is clearly not a mere declamation, but it has rather been decisive 
for the solution of the dispute at hand since with a narrower notion of public order it would 
have been different. The fundamental motivation given by the United Sections to deny the 
enforcement of the foreign remedy in Italy is, in fact, the consideration of fundamental values, 
 
 43 In this sense, see already Cass., 22 June 2016, no. 12962, in Fam. e dir., 2016, p. 1025 ss. In 
the literature, see, among others, also for further references, C. CAMPIGLIO, La genitorialità nelle coppie 
same-sex: un banco di prova per il diritto internazionale privato e l’ordinamento di stato civile, in Fam. 
e dir., 2018, p. 930; E. BILOTTI, Convivenze, unioni civili, genitorialità, adozioni, in Dir. fam. pers., 
2017, p. 873 ss.; ID., L’adozione del figlio del convivente. A Milano prosegue il confronto tra i giudici 
di merito, in Fam. e dir., 2017, p. 1003 ss.; R. SENIGAGLIA, Genitorialità tra biologia e volontà. Tra 
fatto e diritto, essere e dover-essere, in Eur. dir. priv., 2017, p. 1006 ss.; as well as M. CINQUE, Quale 
statuto per il “genitore sociale”?, in Riv. dir. civ., 2017, p. 1490 ss., who persuasively argues that an 
intervention by the legislator remains necessary, at least in order to unequivocally consolidate this 
interpretation, if not for the purpose of more widely putting in place a modernization of the rules on this 
topic.  
 44 See especially ECtHR, 26 June 2014, no. 65192/11, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2014, I, p. 1122 
ss., with a comment by C. CAMPIGLIO, Il diritto all’identità personale del figlio nato all’estero da madre 
surrogata (ovvero, la lenta agonia del limite dell’ordine pubblico); ECtHR, 24 January 2017, Grand 
Chamber, no. 25358/12, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2017, I, p. 501 ss., with a comment by L. LENTI, 
Ancora sul caso Paradiso & Campanelli c. Italia: la sentenza della Grande Camera, p. 495 ss. 
Subsequently, see the first avis consultatif of the ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 10 April 2019, no. P16-2018-
001, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2019, I, p. 764 ss., and the related comments by U. SALANITRO, op. cit., 
p. 740 s., and by A.G. GRASSO, Maternità surrogata e riconoscimento del rapporto con la madre 
intenzionale, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2019, I, p. 757 ss., in particular p. 762 s., who are considering 
this advisory opinion of the ECtHR as generally compatible with the position upheld by the United 
Sections in the 2019 judgement. However, it should be emphasized that such advisory opinions are not 
binding, not even for States which – unlike, so far, Italy – have already ratified the Protocol no. 16 of 
the ECHR, although it is easy to foresee that it will have a very significant incidence and in many States, 
as it has been remarked in I. ANRÒ, Il primo parere reso dalla corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ai 
sensi del protocollo n. 16 alla CEDU: il nuovo strumento alla prova del dialogo tra giudici sul delicato 
tema della maternità surrogata, in Sidi Blog, 6 May 2019. In general, on the new Protocol no. 16 of the 
ECHR, see also, among others, N. POSENATO, O “Protocolo do Diálogo” entra em vigor, in Espaço 
Jurídico Journal of Law, 2018, p. 325 ss.; as well as A. HENKE, La giurisdizione consultiva della Corte 
di Strasburgo nel nuovo Protocollo no. 16 alla CEDU, in Riv. dir. proc., 2018, p. 1244 ss. 
 45 MI. BIANCA, op. cit., p. 373. 




such as the human dignity of the pregnant woman, and the existence of the regime of adoption, 
which are – not unreasonably – considered to prevail over the interest of the minor. Such a 
prevalence is emerging from a balance of interests directly carried out by the legislator, to which 
the judge cannot substitute his own evaluation. 
Although, as already mentioned above, the 2019 United Sections have also declared to 
be substantially in line with the trend already emerged in the decisions of the Court of Cassation 
which for the notion of international public order did only refer to constitutional rules47, it is 
therefore clear that, with regard to this notion, the United Sections did actually take a different 
path, rather following the trend of its own 2017 decision on punitive damages48. 
 
 6. The fluctuating developments in the following judicial practice 
 Despite the fact that, as it has been demonstrated, there is a judicial trend grounded on 
two consistent judgements of the United Sections of the Court of Cassation, the following 
judicial practice still seems to be significantly fluctuating49. 
First of all, there is no lack of decisions which, even if facing partially different problems, 
have placed themselves on a line of substantial continuity with the aforementioned judicial 
trend, or at least with some of the ideas it is based upon. In this regard, it can be pointed out, in 
the first place, to a judgement of the Constitutional Court 50 , which ruled out the 
unconstitutionality of articles 5 and 12, paragraphs 2, 9 and 10, l. no. 40/2004, by affirming, for 
what matters the most here, that the legislative concern to guarantee, in the face of the new 
procreative techniques, the respect of the conditions considered as the best for the development 
of the personality of the newborn cannot be considered as irrational and unjustified in general 
terms. This judgement did also remark the difference between the adoption, which aims to give 
a family to a child who is deprived of it, and the medically assisted procreation, which instead 
 
 47 See supra, note 7. 
 48  For similar findings, see MI. BIANCA, op. cit., p. 377, who stresses also the sometimes 
ambiguous style adopted by the United Sections; U. SALANITRO, op. cit., p. 738; G. FERRANDO, op. ult. 
cit., p. 681; O. FERACI, La nozione di ordine pubblico alla luce della sentenza della Corte di Cassazione 
(Sez. Un. civ.), no. 12193/2019, cit., p. 1145 s. On this issue, see also M. DOGLIOTTI, op. cit., p. 673, as 
well as, more recently, FA. FERRARI, op. cit., p. 184 ss. Against the possibility of applying the same 
notion of international public order with regard to the patrimonial aspects related to the topic of punitive 
damages, see A. SASSI and S. STEFANELLI, op. cit., p. 5 ss., who upheld the opinion that differentiated 
effects should be produced based on the relevance of the different interests at stake. 
49 Similar or even greater fluctuations of the judicial practice can be observed in France: see, 
also for further references, S. BOLLÉE and B. HAFTEL, op. cit., p. 274, where it is critically emphasized 
«la formidable instabilité jurisprudentielle qui caractérise l’époque actuelle», and p. 281, where the 
judgments even of the French Cour de cassation seem to be more and more «une toile de Pénélope».     
 50 Corte cost., 23 October 2019, no. 221, in Corr. giur., 2019, p. 1460 ss., with a note by G. 
RECINTO, La legittimità del divieto per le coppie same sex di accedere alla PMA: la Consulta tra 
qualche “chiarimento” ed alcuni “revirement”. On this judgement, see also U. SALANITRO, A strange 
loop. La procreazione assistita nel canone della Corte costituzionale, in Nuove leggi civ. comm., 2020, 
p. 206 ss., who talks about a position taken by the judges that lends itself to various interpretations and 
which in any case is to be considered as uncertain; as well as B. LIBERALI, La legge n. 40 del 2004 di 
nuovo alla Corte costituzionale: una svolta decisiva (ma forse non ancora definitiva) nella ricostruzione 
di un possibile “diritto a procreare”?, in St. iur., 2020, p. 534 ss. See also the very critical remarks on 
this judgment by M.C. VENUTI, La genitorialità procreativa nella coppia omoaffettiva (femminile). 
Riflessioni a margine di Corte cost. n. 221/2019, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2020, II, p. 664 ss. 
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serves to give a child who did not yet come into existence to a couple (or to a single person) 
realizing the parental aspirations51. The same judgement did also finally specify, with regard to 
art. 32, para. 1, of the Constitution, that the protection of health cannot be extended to impose 
the satisfaction of any subjective aspiration that a couple (or a single person) considers essential, 
so as to make any regulatory obstacle to its realization unconstitutional52. 
 In the same line of thinking, also the Court of Cassation, in a following judgement53 has, 
for what is of utmost interest in this study, reaffirmed the principle that medically assisted 
procreation techniques cannot become a mean to realize the «desire for parenting» alternative 
and equivalent to natural conception, left to the free self-determination of the interested parties54. 
 However, significant attempts have already emerged aiming to overcome, always by way 
of judicial decisions, the position of the United Sections. It may be enough to recall here55 that 
 
51 In the literature, see, among others, F. AZZARRI, I quindici anni della legge 40: nemesi e 
questioni aperte nella disciplina della fecondazione assistita, in Familia, 2019, p. 572. 
 52 A similar line of thinking has also been followed by the Italian Constitutional Court, 15 
November 2019, no. 237, in Fam. e dir., 2020, p. 325 ss., with a note by M. SESTA, L’atto di nascita del 
cittadino straniero nato in Italia non può recare il riconoscimento di due madri, who points out – p. 330 
– that it is the Constitution itself (articles 29 and 30) to demand that parent-child relationships exist 
between a child, a father and a mother and that this has no discriminatory character. 
 53 Cass., 3 April 2020, no. 7668, in Dir. fam. pers., 2020, p. 885 ss. (with notes by E. TROTTA, 
Prevalenza della verità biologica nella redazione degli atti di stato civile e tutela della “genitorialità 
intenzionale”, and by I. BARONE, Le vie della doppia maternità), in Corr. giur., 2020, p. 1041 ss. (with 
a note by A.G. GRASSO, Nascita in Italia e PMA da coppia di donne: la Cassazione nega la costituzione 
del rapporto filiale), and in Fam. e dir., 2020, p. 537 ss. (with a note by A. SCALERA, Doppia maternità 
nell’atto di nascita: la Cassazione fa un passo indietro), on the rectification of a birth certificate issued 
in Italy after heterologous fertilization, which took place abroad, of a member of a female homosexual 
couple. The Court of Cassation refused the rectification, denying the recognition of the parenting of the 
“intentional” mother, arguing that in such a case, since the birth took place in Italy, the domestic public 
order (not the international one) is to be observed, in accordance with which only one person has the 
right to be mentioned as a mother in the birth certificate (more recently on the same topic see also Corte 
cost., 20 October 2020, no. 230, in Pluris, where the broad discretion of the ordinary legislation is very 
persuasively shown). For a first comment, see FA. FERRARI, op. cit., p. 193, note 138, who deems the 
formal correctness of this reasoning to be indisputable, but considers it paradoxical that the same dispute 
would probably have been solved in the opposite sense, if only the birth had taken place abroad, as had 
happened in the case faced by Cass., 30 September 2016, no. 19599, cit. However, critical opinions with 
respect to this last judgement have been expressed, among others, by M. SESTA, op. ult. cit., p. 331, 
where it has been remarked that the idea that two people of the same sex, incapable by nature of 
reproduction, can form a parental couple is not recognized by the Italian Constitution, and also by FA. 
FERRARI, op. cit., p. 172 ss., who has highlighted that such a judgement could have been criticized from 
the perspective of the sources of law and the way they mark the respective areas of intervention by the 
judge and the legislator. 
 54 For a similar opinion, see also Cass., 22 April 2020, no. 8029, in Pluris. This case was again 
about heterologous fertilization, which took place abroad, of a member of a female homosexual couple. 
The Court of Cassation reiterated that the recognition of the child, born in Italy, could only be 
accomplished by the biological mother, not also by her partner, who had not provided any biological 
contribution to the procreation. 
 55 For references also to some recent judgements that are formally agreeing, but substantially 
disagreeing with the position upheld by the United Sections, see M.C. BARUFFI, Gli effetti della 
maternità surrogata al vaglio della Corte di Cassazione italiana e di altre corti, in Riv. dir. int. priv. 
proc., 2020, p. 306 s. 
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recently the first Section of the Court of Cassation has raised, with an interlocutory ruling56, the 
question of constitutional legitimacy of art. 12, para. 6, of the l. no. 40/2004 together with 
articles 18 of the d.p.r. no. 396/2000 and 64, para. 1, lett. g), of the l. no. 218/1995, on the 
ground of the fact that they could be considered as in contrast with the Constitution (articles 2, 
3, 30, 31, 117, para. 1), the European Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (art. 8), the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 
November 1989 (articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 18) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (art. 24). According to the verbose (in the opinion of the author, more than it 
would be convenient for such a kind of measure) ruling under consideration, which invokes 
insistently the first advisory opinion of the ECtHR57 in order to criticize the current situation of 
the Italian law regarding it as markedly incompatible with this ECtHR opinion 58 , the 
aforementioned Italian internal legislation should now be declared illegitimate by the 
Constitutional Court. This Italian internal legislation, in fact, interpreted in accordance with the 
2019 judgement of the United Sections on the surrogate motherhood, as it is well known, 
undoubtedly requires the denial of recognition (without the possibility of a differentiated 
evaluation on a case by case basis) of a foreign judicial measure pursuant to which it would be 
possible to insert in the civil status record of a minor born from a gestational surrogacy also the 
non-biological parent. However, a similar outcome, according to the first Section of the Court 
of Cassation, would be in clear contrast to the various constitutional provisions mentioned 
above, especially in light of the first advisory opinion of the ECtHR. Therefore, this ruling aims 
at overcoming the position of the United Sections, albeit not autonomously but provoking an 
intervention by the Constitutional Court59, whose outcomes are not easy to be predicted60. 
 
 
 56 Cass., ord. 29 April 2020, no. 8325, in Corr. giur., 2020, p. 902 ss., with a note by U. 
SALANITRO, L’ordine pubblico dopo le Sezioni Unite: la Prima Sezione si smarca... e apre alla 
maternità surrogata; and in Fam. e dir., 2020, p. 675 ss., with notes by G. FERRANDO, I diritti del 
bambino con due papà. La questione va alla Corte costituzionale, and by G. RECINTO, Un inatteso 
“revirement” della Suprema Corte in tema di maternità surrogata. In the literature, see also ANG. 
FEDERICO, Forme giuridiche della filiazione e regole determinative della genitorialità: la maternità 
surrogata e il superiore interesse del minore, in Quale diritto di famiglia per la società del XXI secolo?, 
edited by U. Salanitro, Pisa, 2020, p. 340 ss. 
 57 See supra, note 44. 
 58 See, however, for a persuasive argument with a contrary opinion, more recently, M.C. BARUFFI, 
op. ult. cit., p. 308 ss., where also further references can be found. 
 59  This profile, at least from the particular point of view of the path through which the 
constitutionality check should strictly take place (i.e. through the intervention of the Constitutional Court 
and not autonomously by the Court of Cassation), is praised by FA. FERRARI, op. cit., p. 192 s., note 
138; ID., La legge “presa sul serio”. Sulla q.l.c. sollevata dalla Cassazione in tema di maternità 
surrogata e ordine pubblico internazionale (ord. 8325/2020), in Forum di Quad. Cost., 2020, p. 532 ss. 
 60 For interesting observations on the possible content of the decision of the Constitutional Court, 
see B. LIBERALI, Il divieto di maternità surrogata e le conseguenze della sua violazione: quali 
prospettive per un eventuale giudizio costituzionale?, in Oss. cost., 2019, p. 197 ss. According to the 
author, in any case, an immediate and sound intervention by the legislator would be more appropriate, 
since it would offer certain and homogeneous parameters, which are fundamental in such a sensitive 
matter as the surrogacy. Also in France it was recently pointed out that «a reform in this field is 
imperative in order to guarantee the coherence of the system» (C. BIDAUD, La transcription des actes 
de l’état civil étrangers sur les registres français. Cesser de déformer et enfin reformer…, in Rev. crit. 
DIP, 2020, p. 247). 
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 7. Summary of the different opinion trends among the scholars  
 The fluctuations in the judicial decisions outlined above, which are still not settled on 
uniform trends, as it has been illustrated, give rise to an even more uncertain and complicated 
picture if the opinions of the scholars would be also taken into account. This should not be 
particularly surprising, given the famous German saying, certainly suitable also for the Italian 
context, zwei Juristen, drei Meinungen. 
There is, in fact, a first trend, perhaps involving only a minority of scholars (or only less 
eye-catching?) but far from negligible61, definitely favorable, at least in its fundamental findings 
(and with the exception, sometimes, of some critical considerations on other aspects), to the 
notion of international public order chosen by the United Sections, to which, for the reasons 
already recalled above, this study agrees upon62. 
 Nonetheless, there is no shortage of very severe criticisms of the notion upheld by the 
United Sections63: for instance, some scholars even dared to consider it as an approach, if not 
intentionally sovereignist, at least easily exploitable by dangerous sovereignist political 
movements64. 
 However, the trend of opinion which is apparently winning the largest support among 
the scholars is taking a kind of intermediate position, as it identifies significantly valuable 
aspects in the position of the United Sections, but also no less significantly criticizable ones. 
Within this trend there is a number of opinions (that cannot be analyzed in detail here) which 
may be different with regard to the more specific aspects. Nonetheless, it seems to be fairly 
widespread among them the idea that the most serious mistake made by the United Sections 
had been to exclude, with regard to surrogacy motherhood, the possibility for a judge to render 
remarkably diversified solutions by taking into account the peculiarities of each specific case65. 
 
 61  See, among others, M.C. BARUFFI, International surrogacy arrangements test the public 
policy exception. An Italian perspective, cit., p. 300 s.; EAD., Gli effetti della maternità surrogata al 
vaglio della Corte di Cassazione italiana e di altre corti, cit., p. 298 ss.; MI. BIANCA, op. cit., p. 380; T. 
PASQUINO, L’incidenza della giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale e delle Corti europee sul diritto 
privato, in Antologia di casi giurisprudenziali, edited by T. Pasquino, 3a ed., Turin, 2019, p. XIX s.; 
A.M. GAMBINO and T. PASQUINO, Gestazione surrogata: altruismo o costrizione? Profili giuridici, in 
L’Arco di Giano, 2016, p. 92; G. LUCCIOLI, Dalle Sezioni Unite un punto fermo in materia di maternità 
surrogata, in Foro it., 2019, I, c. 4027 ss.; EAD., Qualche riflessione sulla sentenza delle Sezioni Unite 
n. 12193 del 2019 in materia di maternità surrogata, in GenJUS, 2020-1, forthcoming.  
 62 These reasons are further elaborated in M. TESCARO, op. ult. cit., p. 23 ss.  
 63 See, for example, A. VALONGO, La c.d. “filiazione omogenitoriale” al vaglio delle Sezioni 
unite della Cassazione, in Giur. it., 2020, p. 547 ss., who speaks of a trend in the Italian case law that 
can be criticized, among other reasons, because it would be suitable for encouraging an unjustified 
differentiation of legal treatment with regard to access to parenthood between couples of women and 
couples of men. Contra, among others, M.C. BARUFFI, op. ult. cit., p. 314, who underlines how the 
United Sections have developed a reasoning to which any assessment relating to the gender aspect is 
irrelevant; as well as O. FERACI, op. ult. cit., p. 1148. 
 64 In this sense, see M. DOGLIOTTI, op. cit., p. 673 s. 
 65 See, among others, ANG. FEDERICO, op. cit., p. 335 ss.; G. SALVI, Gestazione per altri e ordine 
pubblico: le Sezioni Unite contro la trascrizione dell’atto di nascita straniero, in Giur. it., 2020, p. 1625 
ss.; A. GORGONI, Vita familiare e conservazione dello stato di figlio: a proposito delle Sezioni unite 
sulla (non) trascrivibilità dell’atto di nascita da surroga di maternità all’estero, in Pers. e Merc., 2019, 
p. 141 ss.; ID., Filiazione e responsabilità genitoriale, Milan, 2017, p. 259 s.; G. PERLINGIERI and G. 
ZARRA, Ordine pubblico interno e internazionale tra caso concreto e sistema ordinamentale, Naples, 
2019, p. 94 ss. and 222 s.; G. PERLINGIERI, Ordine pubblico e identità culturale. Le Sezioni Unite in 
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Although the last mentioned criticism is often aiming to promote some undoubtedly relevant 
principles, such as the principles of reasonability and proportionality66, the author believes that 
such a criticism is easy to be overcome if only it would be accepted the idea that the fundamental 
choices for the implementation of constitutional principles, also but not only with regard to the 
clarification of the notion of international public order, should be carried out, in the first place, 
by the legislator, for the reasons already explained above67. 
 
 8. Conclusions 
 Even if the analysis is limited to taking into consideration only the opinions of the Italian 
scholars and the decisions of the Italian judges 68 , there is no shortage of different 
reconstructions and emphasis given to different aspects, as it has been possible to see from the 
previous pages. Nevertheless, the author hopes that the Italian legal system will retain a notion 
of international public order more evolved compared to those previously accepted, but still with 
a significant defensive potential of the most important features of the national legislation, such 
as in the case, analyzed above, of the 2017 judgement of the United Sections on punitive 
damages and of the 2019 judgement again of the United Sections on surrogate motherhood. 
 If things would not evolve in this direction and the judges, eventually including the 
Constitutional Court, will shortly start moving towards a different direction overcoming these 
United Sections judgements, even without considering the substantive issues relating to the 
individual aspects involved, it will give rise to considerable doubts with regard to the 
effectiveness of the “nomophilachy” function of the Court of Cassation and consequently also 
 
tema di c.d. maternità surrogata, in Dir. succ. fam., 2019, p. 337 ss.; V. BARBA, Nota a Cass. Sez. Un. 
12193/2019, in GenIUS, 2019-2, p. 19 ss.; ID., L’ordine pubblico internazionale, cit., p. 435 s.; G. 
FERRANDO, Maternità per sostituzione all’estero: le Sezioni Unite dichiarano inammissibile la 
trascrizione dell’atto di nascita. Un primo commento, cit., p. 684 ss.; A. SASSI and S. STEFANELLI, op. 
cit., p. 2 s. and 24 s.; V. SCALISI, Maternità surrogata: come «far cose con regole», in Riv. dir. civ., 
2017, p. 1099 s.; U. SALANITRO, Ordine pubblico internazionale, filiazione omosessuale e surrogazione 
di maternità, cit., p. 740. 
 66 In a similar vein, see, also for further references, G. PERLINGIERI and G. ZARRA, op. cit., 
passim. It seems that the recent decision taken by Cass., ord. 29 April 2020, no. 8325, cit. followed this 
opinion. 
 67 On a similar line of thought, see, more recently, M. SESTA, ibidem; as well as M.C. BARUFFI, 
op. ult. cit., p. 317 ss., who persuasively, on the one hand, calls for an intervention by the legislator to 
reform the regime of the adoption by introducing «fast-track procedures» and, on the other hand, warns 
about the risk that a case-by-case approach may lead to overburdening the courtrooms with such 
sensitive issues, which would instead deserve uniform solutions established in advance, not a regulatory 
anarchy and differentiated practices. More in general on the subject see also the brilliant observations 
in M. LUCIANI, Dottrina del moto delle costituzioni e vicende della Costituzione repubblicana, in Oss. 
sulle fonti, 2013, p. 16 s., where it is clarified that art. 101, para. 1, Cost., providing that «Justice is 
administered in the name of the people» and not of the nation, prohibits that the “deep streams” which 
the observer believes to perceive in the society may prevail over the popular will expressed through the 
legislation. 
 68 For detailed references concerning many other legal systems, see, more recently, A. STAZI, 
Human genomics and surrogate motherhood: legal pluralism and the circulation of models, in 
Comparative Law Review, n. 9/2 (2018), p. 75 ss.; E. FALLETTI, “Di chi sono figlio? Dipende da dove 
mi trovo”. Riflessioni comparate su status, genitorialità e GPA, in Fam. e dir., 2020, p. 743 ss.  
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about the certainty – or calculability69 – of the law. A sudden change occurring in the highest 
level of the judiciary will let the top-level judges appear no less unstable – or, as it has been 
recently written about the French Cour de cassation, «inconstant»70 – than the scholars, within 
whom, however, the variety and perhaps also the changing opinions are – if not even desirable 




 69 N. IRTI, Un diritto incalcolabile, Turin, 2016, passim. See also ID., Il tessitore di Goethe (per 
la decisione robotica), in Riv. dir. proc., 2018, p. 1177 ss.; ID., Gli eredi della positività, in Nuovo dir. 
civ., 2016, p. 11 ss. 
70 S. BOLLÉE and B. HAFTEL, op. cit., p. 267. 
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